4 Wm. Mitchell J. L. & P. 4
By: Leslie Lienemann and Justin Cummins[Y]

In a case of first impression, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a woman who experienced sexual harassment while performing according to the terms of a contract was not protected by the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).[1] The case was brought by business owner Pamela Krueger and her corporation, Diamond Dust Contracting, after Krueger was sexually harassed by employees of Zeman Construction Company, a business with which Diamond Dust Contracting had a contract.[2] The Minnesota Supreme Court held that only Diamond Dust Contracting, and not Krueger, could sue for harassment because only Diamond Dust Contracting was a signatory to the business contract with Zeman Construction Company.[3] Continue reading

[A]

4 Wm. Mitchell J. L. & P. 3
By: Imani Jaafar-Mohammad, Esq. and Charlie Lehmann[Y]
 
Introduction

There are many misconceptions surrounding women’s rights in Islam.  The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the basic rights of women in Islam in the context of marriage and divorce.  This article is only to be viewed as a basic outline of women’s rights in Islam regarding marriage and divorce.  Muslim clients’ situations will vary greatly depending on what Islamic School of Thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi) they follow, whether they are Sunni or Shiite, their cultural traditions, and a variety of other factors. Continue reading

4 Wm. Mitchell J. L. & Prac. 2
By: Judge Jerome Abrams[Y]

INTRODUCTION

The central concept behind insurance in general, and liability insurance in particular, is risk transfer.[1] The simple nature of paying some amount of money in advance of a future event, which could result in a greater loss, provides some measure of economic security.[2] However, there can be many uncertainties involved in risk transfer through insurance.[3] Continue reading

4 Wm. Mitchell J.L. & Prac. 1

By: Kristin Berger Parker and Ellen G. Sampson

[Y]
           This paper looks at the kinds of statements that can be considered defamatory, the chilling effect that the tort of defamation has on the communication of important information, and also examines the similarities and distinctions between public and private defamation, focusing on the speech interests at hand.  It then discusses the privilege defenses that courts have developed to alleviate the chilling effect of the tort, both in the public and private contexts.  Finally, this paper considers how defamation and the privileges operate in the employment context. Continue reading

3 Wm. Mitchell J.L. & Prac. 3

By: Professor Kenneth L. Port [1]

On March 19, 2009, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a significant step in leveling the intellectual property playing field.  In General Cas. Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc.,[2] the Court determined that trademark infringement falls within the scope of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy and that it amounts to an advertising injury.[3] As such, trademark infringement should fall within the scope of the insurance policy and the insurance company must defend the defendant.[4] Continue reading

3 Wm. Mitchell J.L. & Prac. 2

By: Professor Michael K. Jordan[Y]
I. INTRODUCTION

Few, if any, would question the need to interdict the movement of drugs across the borders of the United States.  The problems caused by the sale of drugs on our streets and the resulting indirect and direct hardship on every citizen cannot be doubted.  Now the tough question: how far are we willing to go in stopping, or at least curtailing this drug trafficking?  Should we subject individuals who have no history of drug use to drug testing simply because they are involved in the front-line defense against drug traffickers?  Is the risk that these individuals may have their integrity compromised by drug use sufficient to justify drug testing of them, even if there is no evidence of their using drugs? Continue reading

3 Wm. Mitchell J.L. & Prac. 1

By: Phil Duran[Y]
Introduction:

Travel up the North Shore’s Highway 61 to Canada, or down I-35 to Iowa, and you will find, within a few hours’ drive, destinations where discrimination in marriage has come to an end and same-sex couples from Minnesota and elsewhere may legally marry.[1] Travel west on I-90, or in either direction on I-94, and you will soon enter states whose constitutions have been amended by popular vote to deny same-sex couples access to marriage (and in some cases to any other form of legal recognition).[2] In the middle of it all stands Minnesota:  Minnesota statutes prohibit same-sex couples from marrying, but efforts to write this policy into our constitution have seemingly ground to a halt.[3] Continue reading